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Abstrat. Shemati proofs are funtions whih an produe a proof of
a proposition for eah value of their parameters. A shemati proof an
be onstruted by abstrating a general pattern of proof from several ex-
amples of a family of proofs. In this paper we examine several interesting
aspets of the use of shemati proofs in mathematis. Furthermore, we
pose several onjetures about the psyhologial validity of the use of
shemati proofs in mathematis. These onjetures need testing, hene
we propose an empirial study whih would either support or refute our
onjetures. Ultimately, we suggest that shemati proofs are worthy of
a loser and more detailed study and investigation.
1 Introdution
In this paper we study and address several questions about the nature of math-
ematial proofs. How an a well hosen example often onvey the idea of a proof
better than the proof itself? How is it possible for proofs to be erroneous, and for
suh faulty \proofs" to persist for deades? Why are the proofs of some interme-
diate results less intuitive than the original theorem? We suggest that studying
shemati proofs might provide some answers to suh questions.
Shemati proofs have been used and studied in various branhes of mathe-
matis. Their use has been suessfully mehanised in automated mathematial
reasoning [1, 2℄. We hypothesise that humans often use proedures similar to the
onstrution of shemati proofs. The aim of this paper is to motivate ognitive
sientists and ognitive psyhologists that shemati proofs are an interesting
onept in mathematis and that they are worthy of a loser investigation from
a psyhologial point of view. Suh an investigation would shed some light on the
nature of human mathematial thought. We examine some interesting aspets
of shemati proofs and postulate a number of onjetures about the psyho-
logial validity of shemati proofs. We have anedotal evidene to support our
intuitions, however, we have not onduted any systemati experiments. Hene,
in x7, we propose an experimental investigation and we suggest some of the
questions that suh an investigation ould attempt to answer.
2Shemati proofs are funtions, i.e., programs, whih output a proof for eah
value of their parameters, i.e., inputs. That is, they are a way of apturing a
family of proofs.
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For example, onsider a trivial theorem, let us all it multiple
addition, whih says that to get a value of an x in (: : : ((x+a
1
)+a
2
)+  +a
n
) = y
one has to subtrat all the a
i
from y. So, more formally, the theorem an be
expressed as ((: : : ((x+a
1
)+a
2
)+   +a
n
) = y)) (x = (: : : ((y a
n
) a
n 1
) 
     a
2
)   a
1
). The shemati proof for this theorem is the following informal
program (where we assume that we have denitions of proof, apply, et.):
proof (n) = apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V ) n times
whih rewrites n times, terms in the theorem of the form U + V = W to terms
of the form U = W   V . A shemati output of this program gives a proof of
the multiple addition theorem (bold bloks represent program exeution steps,
i.e., appliations of rewrite rules on the theorem):
(((: : : ((x + a
1
) + a
2
) +    ) + a
n 2
) + a
n 1
) + a
n
= y
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
((: : : ((x + a
1
) + a
2
) +    ) + a
n 2
) + a
n 1
= y   a
n
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
(: : : ((x + a
1
) + a
2
) +    ) + a
n 2
= (y   a
n
)  a
n 1
.
.
.
x = (: : : ((y   a
n
)  a
n 1
)       a
2
)  a
1
A proedure that an be used to onstrut shemati proofs is to prove some
speial ases of a proposition, extrat a pattern from these proofs, and abstrat
this pattern into a general shemati proof. We give examples of proofs for speial
ases for the above theorem where n = 2 and n = 3. When the shemati proof is
given an input 2, then the program is instantiated to proof (2) = apply (U+V =
W ) U =W   V ) 2 times . The output of this program is:
(x+ a
1
) + a
2
= b
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
x+ a
1
= b  a
2
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
x = (b  a
2
)  a
1
Similarly, when the shemati proof is given an input 3, then the program is
instantiated to proof (3) = apply (U + V = W ) U = W   V ) 3 times . The
1
Shemati proofs are often used as an alternative to mathematial indution (see x2).
3output of this program is:
((x + a
1
) + a
2
) + a
3
= b
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
(x + a
1
) + a
2
= b  a
3
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
x+ a
1
= (b  a
3
)  a
2
w
w

apply (U + V =W ) U =W   V )
x = ((b  a
3
)  a
2
)  a
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Finally, the shemati proof needs to be shown to be orret, i.e., that proof (n)
outputs a proof of the theorem for ase n. This is disussed in x2. In x3 we give
more examples of the use of shemati proofs in mathematis.
There are three partiular aspets of shemati proofs that we investigate in
some detail. First, we examine how shemati proofs an be onstruted from ex-
amples of proofs. The mathematial foundation for the onstrution of shemati
proofs provides a justiation for the step from examples to general proofs to
theorem-hood. So, in x4, our rst onjeture is that:
Shemati proofs explain how examples an be used for onstruting gen-
eral proofs.
Seond, we examine how shemati proofs have been used in the past to rep-
resent laimed proofs of theorems. However, upon loser examination, it turned
out in some ases that what was thought to be a proof, was atually faulty
and not a proof at all. We argue that this may be due to the omission of the
veriation of the shemati proof. Hene, in x5, our seond onjeture is that:
Shemati proofs aount for some erroneous proofs in mathematis.
We give some historial examples whih support our onjeture.
Finally, shemati proofs of some theorems an be very dierent from their
standard non-shemati indutive ounterparts. They often seem to be more
easily understood than indutive proofs. A number of examples are given to
support our laim. Therefore, in x6, our third and nal onjeture is that:
Shemati proofs are more intuitive than indutive proofs.
1.1 Tehnial Terminology
Here we give some denitions of tehnial terms used in this paper that might
prove useful. Notie that in the literature, the terms indution, abstration and
generalisation are often used interhangeably for the same onept. We have
three dierent notions for these terms, and hene dene them here preisely.
4A Reursive funtion is a funtion whose denition appeals to itself without
an innite regression. For example, Hex is a reursive funtion whih for
eah input natural number n gives the n
th
hexagonal number:
Hex(0) = 0
Hex(1) = 1
Hex(n+ 1) = Hex(n) + 6 n
The Suessor funtion is a funtion that adds one to its argument. For ex-
ample, s(s(0)) = s(1) = 2.
Instantiation is a proess of replaing a variable with some value. Instantiation
of a funtion is a proess of assigning values to the arguments of the funtion
and evaluating the funtion for these values. For example, instantiating the
above funtion Hex for 3 gives Hex(3) = Hex(2 + 1) = Hex(2) + (6 2) =
(Hex(1) + (6 1)) + 12 = 1 + 6 + 12 = 19.
Abstration is a proess of extrating a general argument from its examples.
In this paper it refers to onstruting a shemati proof from example proofs.
For example, the proess of onstruting proof (n) for the multiple addition
theorem given above from the examples of its proof for n = 2 and n = 3 is
referred to as abstration.
Another meaning of abstration in this paper is to refer to an abstration de-
vie, suh as ellipsis (i.e., the \: : :" notation), to represent general diagrams.
Abstration is sometimes referred to as indutive inferene, or \philosophial
indution", or generalisation.
Generalisation replaes a formula by a more general one. For example, on-
stants, funtions or prediates an be replaed by variables (e.g., x+ 3 = y
is generalised to x+a = y where a onstant 3 is replaed by a variable a), or
universally quantied variables are deoupled (e.g., 8x:(x+x)+x = x+(x+x)
is generalised to 8x8y8z:(x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)).
Objet-level statement is a well-formed term, proof or inferene step of the
logi in use (f. meta-level statement). For example, the proof of multiple
addition theorem given above in x1 is an objet-level statement.
Meta-level statement is a statement about an objet-level statement, in some
logial theory (f. objet-level statement). For example, a laim that the
proof of multiple addition theorem given above in x1, is a orret proof of this
theorem, is a meta-level statement about the proof of the multiple addition
theorem.
Mathematial indution or standard indution is a rule of inferene in some
logial theory whih is used to prove the statement that some proposition
P (n) is true for all values of n > n
0
, where n
0
is some base value. This
rule of inferene makes an assertion about objet-level statements (f. meta-
indution). For example, in Peano arthmeti, the rule of indution is:
P (0) P (n)! P (s(n))
8n:P (n)
5Meta-indution is a rule of inferene in some logial theory whih is used to
prove the meta-statement that some proposition MP (n) about the objet-
level statement P (m) is true for all values of n > n
0
, where n
0
is some base
value. This rule of inferene makes an assertion about proofs rather than
objet-level statements (f. mathematial indution). For example, in Peano
arithmeti, the rule of meta-indution is (where proof is a reursive funtion,
and \:" stands for \is a proof of"):
proof (0) : P (0) proof (n) : P (n)! proof (s(n)) : P (s(n))
8n:proof (n) : P (n)
Shemati is an adjetive that refers to some general way of desribing a lass
of objets. We use this adjetive when desribing a program that generates
a proof for all instanes of some orresponding theorem. We refer to these
programs as shemati proofs. A formal denition of a shemati proof is
given in x2 in Denition 3.
2 Shemati proofs
Our interest in shemati proofs omes from the perspetive of automated rea-
soning, where the aim is to implement a system whih onstruts shemati
proofs. The automation of proof extration requires some suitable mehanism to
apture a general proof. Shemati proofs provide suh a mehanism. General
shemati proofs an be onstruted from a sequene of instanes. A mathemat-
ial basis whih justies the step from spei examples to a general shemati
proof is the onstrutive !-rule [1℄. ! is the name given to the innite set
f0; 1; 2; 3; : : :g, or equivalently, using the suessor funtion s (see x1.1), the
set f0; s(0); s(s(0)); s(s(s(0))); : : :g. Typially, a shemati proof is formalised
as a reursive program. This reursive program allows us to onlude a general
shemati proof for the universally quantied theorem. In this setion, we for-
mally dene what a shemati proof is, and what is the mathematial basis for
its formalisation.
The mathematial basis for extration of shemati proofs is the onstrutive
!-rule. This rule is a version of the !-rule [3℄:
Denition 1 (!-Rule).
The !-rule allows inferene of the sentene 8x: P (x) from an innite sequene
P (n) for n 2 ! of sentenes
P (0); P (1); P (2); : : :
8n:P (n)
Using the !-rule, an innite number of premisses needs to be proved in order to
onlude a universal statement. This makes the !-rule unusable for automation.
Hene, we onsider the onstrutive version of this rule [1℄:
6Denition 2 (Construtive !-Rule).
The onstrutive !-rule allows inferene of the sentene 8x: P (x) from an innite
sequene P (n) for n 2 ! of sentenes
P (0); P (1); P (2); : : :
8n:P (n)
suh that eah premiss P (n) is proved uniformly (from parameter n).
Note that the !-rule and the onstrutive !-rule are stronger alternatives for
mathematial indution.
The uniformity riterion is taken to be the provision of a omputable pro-
edure desribing the proof of P (n), e.g., proof (n). The requirement for a om-
putable proedure is equivalent to the notion that the proofs for all premisses
are aptured in a reursive funtion. We refer to suh a reursive funtion as a
shemati proof.
Denition 3 (Shemati Proof).
A shemati proof is a reursive funtion,
2
e.g., proof
P
(n),
3
whih outputs a
proof of some proposition P (n) given some n as input.
Suppose the reursive funtion, proof, is a shemati proof. The funtion
proof takes one argument, namely a parameter n. In general, this funtion an
be dened to take any number of arguments. By instantiation, i.e., by assigning
a partiular value to n and passing it as an argument to the funtion proof, and
by appliation of this instantiated funtion to the theorem, proof
P
(n) gener-
ates a proof for a partiular premiss P (n). More preisely, proof
P
(n) desribes
the inferene steps (i.e., rules) made in proofs for eah P (n). Now, proof (n) is
shemati in n, beause we may apply some rule R a funtion of n (or a onstant)
number of times. That is, the number of times that a rule R is applied in the
proof might depend on the parameter n. This reursive denition of a proof is
used as a basis for implementation of the shemati proofs [2, 1℄.
From a pratial point of view, the onstrutive !-rule and shemati proofs
eliminate the need for an innite number of proofs, or in other words, they enable
us to speify an innite number of proofs in a nite way. Moreover, they provide
a tehnique whih enables an automation of searh for proofs of universally
quantied theorems from instanes of proofs.
We now show how shemati proofs of universally quantied theorems an
be found using several heuristis.
2.1 Finding a Shemati Proof
A shemati proof an be onstruted by onsidering individual examples of
proofs for instanes of a theorem, and then extrating a general pattern from
2
Tehnial terminology is explained in x1.1
3
Note that we omit the use of subsript P in proof
P
(n) where it is lear whih theorem
proof proves.
7these instanes. The idea is that in order to extrat a general struture ommon
to all instanes of a proof, the partiular examples of proofs of a theorem whih
are onsidered, need to be general representatives of all instanes, and not speial
ases. These are normally taken to be some intermediate values, e.g., 5 and 6,
or 7 and 9, rather than the initial values, e.g., 0 and 1, sine the proofs for
initial values of a parameter n are almost always speial ases. Therefore, we
use suh intermediate values, e.g., P (7) and P (9) and orrespondingly proof (7)
and proof (9), to extrat the pattern, whih we hope is general. A struture
whih is ommon to the onsidered examples is extrated by an abstration.
The result is the onstrution of a general shemati proof. If the instanes
for the intermediate values that were onsidered are not representative of all
instanes, so that the abstration was arried out on inomplete information,
then the onstruted reursive funtion proof ould be wrong. Therefore, the
funtion proof needs to be veried as orret. This involves reasoning about the
proof (using meta-level reasoning), and showing that proof indeed generates a
orret proof of eah P (n).
The following proedure summarises the essene of using the onstrutive
!-rule in shemati proofs:
1. Prove a few partiular ases (e.g., P (7), P (9), ... and thereby disover proof (7),
proof (9), ...).
2. Abstrat proof (n) from these proofs (e.g., from proof (7), proof (9), ...).
3. Verify that proof (n) proves P (n) by meta-indution
4
on n.
The general pattern is abstrated from the individual proof instanes by
learning indution or abstration. By meta-indution we mean that we introdue
a theory Meta suh that for all n the base ase of the meta-indution is:
Meta ` proof (0) : P (0)
and the step ase is:
Meta ` proof (n) : P (n)  ! proof (n+ 1) : P (n+ 1)
By meta-indution we need to show in the meta-theory that given a proposition
P (n), proof(n) indeed proves it, i.e., it gives a orret proof with P (n) as its
onlusion, and axioms of some objet logi as its premisses. This ensures that
the onstruted general shemati proof is indeed a orret proof for all instanes
of a proposition.
4
The meta-indution is often muh simpler than the mathematial indution that is
alternative to the shemati proof. For example, whereas generalisation is required
in some objet-level indutive proofs, no generalisation is required in the meta-
indution at the veriation stage of the orresponding shemati proof. See x4 and x6
for more disussion and some examples.
83 Appliation of shemati proofs
To illustrate the use of the onstrutive !-rule in shemati proofs, we give
here ve examples of shemati proofs for the following theorems: an arith-
meti shemati proof of assoiativity of addition implemented by Baker [1℄, a
shemati proof of rotate-length theorem, two diagrammati shemati proofs,
the rst of the theorem regarding the sum of odd naturals implemented by Jam-
nik et al [2℄, and the seond regarding the sum of hexagonal numbers presented
by Penrose [4℄, and a faulty shemati proof of Euler's theorem presented by
Lakatos in [5℄.
3.1 Assoiativity of Addition
Consider a theorem about the assoiativity of addition, stated as
(x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)
Baker studied shemati proofs of suh theorems in [1℄. The reursive denition
of \+" is given as follows:
0 + Y = Y (1)
s(X) + Y = s(X + Y ) (2)
We also need a reexive law 8n: n = n.
The onstrutive !-rule is used on x in the statement of the assoiativity
of addition. We write any instane of x as s
n
(0). By s
n
(0) is meant the n-th
numeral, i.e., the term formed by applying the suessor funtion to 0 n times.
Next, the axioms are used as rewrite rules from left to right, and substitution
is arried out in the !-proof, under the appropriate instantiation of variables.
Hene, the following enoding:
8n:(s
n
(0) + y) + z = s
n
(0) + (y + z)
8x: (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)
where n is the parameter, represents any instane of the onstrutive !-rule in
our example (note the use of ellipsis):
(0 + y) + z = 0 + (y + z); (s(0) + y) + z = s(0) + (y + z);
s(s(0 ) + y) + z = s(s(0)) + y + z); : : :
8x: (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)
We onstrut a shemati proof in terms of this parameter, where n in the
anteedent aptures the innity of premisses atually present, one for eah value
of n. This removes the need to present an innite number of proofs. The aim is
to redue both sides of the equation to the same term. The shemati proof of
this theorem is the following program:
proof(n) = Apply rule (2) n times on eah side of equality,
Apply rule (1) one on eah side of equality,
Apply rule (2) n times on left side of equality,
Apply Reexive Law
9Running this program on the assoiativity theorem proves it. For example:
(s
n
(0) + y) + z = s
n
(0) + (y + z)
w
w

Apply rule (2) n times on eah side
.
.
.
s
n
(0 + y) + z = s
n
(0 + (y + z))
w
w

Apply rule (1) on eah side
s
n
(y) + z = s
n
(y + z)
w
w

Apply rule (2) n times on left
.
.
.
s
n
(y + z) = s
n
(y + z)
w
w

Apply Reexive Law
true
Note that the number of proof steps depends on n, whih is the instane of x
we are onsidering. We see that the proof is shemati in n | ertain steps are
arried out a number of times depending on n.
3.2 Rotate-Length Theorem
The rotate-length theorem is about rotating a list its length number of times,
and an be stated as:
rotate(length(l); l) = l
where length(l) gives the length of a list l, and rotate(x; l) takes the rst x
elements of a list l and puts them at its end (e.g., rotate(3; [a; b; ; d; e℄) =
[d; e; a; b; ℄), and an be dened as:
rotate(0; l) = l
rotate(x; [ ℄) = [ ℄
rotate(n+ 1; l :: ls) = rotate(n; ls[l℄)
Note that :: is inx ons (it takes an element and a list and puts the element
at the front of the list, e.g., 1 :: [2; 3; 4℄ = [1; 2; 3; 4℄) and  is inx append
(it takes two lists and puts them together, e.g., [1; 2; 3℄[4; 5℄ = [1; 2; 3; 4; 5℄).
Consider a shemati proof of this theorem. First we give an example proof for
some instane of a theorem. An example proof for the instane of a list of any
ve elements l = [a; b; ; d; e℄, i.e., length(l) = 5 goes as follows. Let the list l
onsist of ve elements. We take the rst element of the list and put it to the
bak of the list. Now, we do the same for the remaining four elements.
10
rotate(length([a; b; ; d; e℄); [a; b; ; d; e℄) =
rotate(5; [a; b; ; d; e℄) =
rotate(4; [b; ; d; e; a℄) =
rotate(3; [; d; e; a; b℄) =
rotate(2; [d; e; a; b; ℄) =
rotate(1; [e; a; b; ; d℄) = [a; b; ; d; e℄
It is very easy to see that this proess gives us bak the original list. Moreover,
it is lear that if we follow the same proedure, i.e., shemati proof, for a list of
any length, we always get bak the original list. Hene, the number of inferene
steps in the proof depends on n, so a proof is shemati in n:
rotate(length([a
1
; a
2
; a
3
; : : : ; a
n
℄); [a
1
; a
2
; a
3
; : : : ; a
n
℄) =
rotate(n; [a
1
; a
2
; a
3
; : : : ; a
n
℄) =
rotate(n  1; [a
2
; a
3
; : : : ; a
n
; a
1
℄) =
rotate(n  2; [a
3
; : : : ; a
n
; a
1
; a
2
℄) =
.
.
.
rotate(1; [a
n
; a
1
; a
2
; a
3
; : : :℄) = [a
1
; a
2
; a
3
; : : : ; a
n
℄
3.3 Sum of odd natural numbers
We now onsider a theorem about the sum of odd naturals and its shemati
proof as studied by Jamnik et al in [2℄ and [6℄. Jamnik et al studied the no-
tion of diagrammati proofs and formalisation of diagrammati reasoning. A
diagrammati proof is aptured by a shemati proof that is onstruted from
examples of graphial manipulations of instanes of a theorem. This diagram-
mati shemati proof has to be heked for orretness. A diagrammati proof
onsists of diagrammati inferene steps, rather than logial inferene rules. Di-
agrammati inferene steps are the geometri operations applied to a diagram.
The operations on diagrams produe new diagrams. Chains of diagrammati in-
ferene rules, speied by the shemati proof, form the diagrammati proof of
a theorem. In Jamnik et al's formalisation of diagrammati reasoning, diagrams
are used as an abstrat representation of natural numbers, and are represented
as olletions of dots. Some examples of diagrams are a square, a triangle, an
ell (two adjaent sides of a square). Some examples of geometri operations are
lut (split an ell from a square), remove row, remove olumn.
We demonstrate here a diagrammati proof of the theorem about the sum of
odd natural numbers. The theorem an be stated as
n
2
= 1 + 3 + 5 +   + (2n  1)
We onsider an instane of the theorem 4
2
= 1+3+5+7 and its diagrammati
proof where n = 4. Let us hoose that n
2
is represented by a square of magnitude
n, (2n   1) is represented as an ell whose two sides are both n long, i.e., odd
natural numbers are represented by ells, and a natural number 1 is represented
as a dot. The proof of this instane of the theorem onsists of utting a square
4 times into ells.
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Notie, that a similar proedure holds for a square of any size, i.e., for any
instane of the theorem. Therefore, these steps are suÆient to transform a
square of magnitude n representing the LHS of the theorem to n ells of inreasing
magnitudes representing the RHS of the theorem.
Note that the number of proof steps (i.e., diagrammati inferene steps)
depends on n { for a square of size n the proof onsists of n luts. Hene the
proof is shemati in n. Here is a denition of this shemati proof:
proof (n+ 1) = apply lut, then proof (n)
proof (0) = empty
3.4 Sum of hexagonal numbers
Let us now examine a theorem about the sum of hexagonal numbers and its
(diagrammati) shemati proof as presented by Penrose in [4℄. We repeat here
the formal reursive denition of hexagonal numbers from x1.1:
Hex(0) = 0
Hex(1) = 1
Hex(n+ 1) = Hex(n) + 6 n
Informally, hexagonal numbers ould be presented as hexagons where the hexag-
onal number is the number of dots in a hexagon:
1 7 19 .  .  .  .
The theorem is stated as follows:
n
3
= Hex(1) +Hex(2) +   +Hex(n)
Let n
3
be represented by a ube of magnitude n and Hex(n) by an n
th
hexagon.
The instane of the proof that we onsider here is for n = 3. The diagrammati
proof of the sum of hexagonal numbers onsists of breaking a ube into a series
of half-shells. A half-shell onsists of three adjaent faes of a ube.
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If eah half-shell is projeted onto a plane, that is, if we look at the top-right-bak
orner of eah half-shell down the main diagonal of the ube from far enough,
then a hexagon an be seen. So the ube is then presented as the sum of all
half-shells, i.e., hexagonal numbers.
Again, notie that the general proof holds for any instane n. That is, these steps
are suÆient to transform a ube of magnitude n representing the LHS of the
theorem to n inreasing hexagons representing the RHS of the theorem. Note
that the number of diagrammati inferene steps depends on the value of n, so
the proof is shemati in n.
3.5 Euler's Theorem
Let us onsider a famous example of an erroneous shemati \proof", namely,
the history of Euler's theorem [5℄. Euler's theorem states that for any polyhedron
V   E + F = 2 holds, where V is the number of verties, E is the number of
edges, and F is the number of faes. Lakatos
5
initially gives a proof, historially
due to Cauhy, of the theorem, whih is a uniform method for proving instanes
of Euler's theorem. Thus, the method is a shemati proof. However parts of
the method are not expliitly stated, but seem very onvining when applied
5
The proof of Euler's theorem is also disussed in [7, pages 47-48℄.
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to simple polyhedra. Here is a summary of the proof method taken from [5,
pages 7-8℄.
6
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Take any polyhedron (note that in our ase, we take a ube, but the result is
the same for any polyhedron). Imagine that it is hollow, and that its faes are
made out of rubber (see (a) of the diagram above). Now, remove one fae from
the polyhedron, and streth the rest of the polyhedron onto the plane (see (b)
of the diagram). Note that sine we have taken one fae o, our formula should
be V  E + F = 1. Note also that the relations between the verties, edges and
faes are preserved in this way. Triangulate all of the faes of this plane network
(i.e., we are adding the same number of edges and faes to the network, so the
formula remains the same | see () of the diagram). Now, start removing the
boundary edges (see (d) of the diagram). This will have the eet of removing
an edge and a fae from the network at the same time, or two edges, one vertex
and one fae, so our formula is still preserved. We ontinue removing edges in
appropriate order (see (e)), thus preserving the formula, until we are left with
one triangle only. Clearly, for this triangle V   E + F = 1 holds, sine there
are three verties, three edges and one fae. Here is an informal diagrammati
shemati proof:
1. remove one fae from any given polyhedron,
2. streth the rest of the polyhedron onto the plane,
3. triangulate all of the faes that are not triangles already,
4. remove the boundary edges one after another, until you are left with a single
triangle.
However, this shemati \proof" is faulty, and we will disuss the reasons for
this in x5.
6
The diagram demonstrating the proof of Euler's theorem is also taken from [5,
page 8℄.
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4 Learning from examples
Shemati proofs and the onstrutive !-rule explain why one or more examples
an represent a general proof. Therefore, our rst onjeture is that shemati
proofs explain the use of examples for onstrution of proofs. Furthermore, we
propose that reasoning with onrete ases, i.e., instanes or examples, is often
more easily understood than reasoning with abstrat notions.
As desribed in x2, the onstrutive !-rule enables us to apture innitary
onepts in a nite way. It enables us to use shemati proofs in order to prove
universal statements. The onstrutive !-rule gives us a mathematial basis
whih justies how and why the examples or instanes of problems an be used
in order to onlude a general statement, in our ase a general proof of a univer-
sally quantied theorem. We desribe two systems whih use shemati proofs,
and hene reason with instanes of theorems in order to prove universally quan-
tied theorems, namely Baker's system CORE whih reasons about theorems of
arithmeti [1℄, and Jamnik's system Diamond whih formalises diagrammati
reasoning [2℄.
Baker used shemati proofs in order to prove theorems of arithmeti, espe-
ially the ones whih ould not be proved by automated systems without the use
of generalisation (for denition, see x1.1). One of Baker's example theorems is
a speial version of the theorem about assoiativity of addition. In x3.1 we gave
a general version of this theorem. Baker's speial version of the theorem an be
stated as:
(x+ x) + x = x+ (x+ x)
The CORE system automatially proves this theorem by enumerating instanes
of a proof, then onstruting a general shemati proof, and nally, verifying
that the shemati proof is orret. Instanes of the theorem an be enoded as:
(s
n
(0) + s
n
(0)) + s
n
(0) = s
n
(0) + (s
n
(0) + s
n
(0))
for eah parameter n. The shemati proof of this theorem is idential to the
one in x3.1. In a theorem prover that annot onstrut shemati proofs, this
theorem would normally be proved by mathematial indution. But indution
in this ase is bloked, as P (s(n)) annot be given in terms of P (n) (for more
details see [1℄). Hene, generalisation to full assoiativity (x+y)+z = x+(y+z)
is neessary. Rather than using generalisation, as in other automated reasoning
systems, CORE was able to prove this theorem using onrete instanes of a
theorem and its proof.
Jamnik uses shemati proofs for diagrammati proofs of theorems of natural
number arithmeti, like the theorem about the sum of odd natural numbers given
in x3.3. To devise a general diagrammati proof of this theorem, one would need
to use abstrat diagrams, i.e., diagrams of a general size. Therefore, diagrams
would have to be represented using abstration devies, suh as ellipsis. Ab-
stration devies in diagrams are problemati as they are inherently ambiguous.
The pattern on either end of the ellipsis needs to be indued by the system. For
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instane, it is ambiguous whether an abstrat olletion of rows or olumns of
dots with ellipsis, like this:
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is a square or a retangle, or if it is of odd or even magnitude. The problem
beomes more aute when dealing with more omplex strutures. To reognise
the pattern that the ellipsis represents, the system needs to arry out some
sort of pattern reognition tehnique whih dedues the most likely pattern and
stores it in an exat internal representation. This guessed pattern might still
be wrong. Beause of the ambiguity of ellipsis it is diÆult to keep trak of it
during manipulations of diagrams. Shemati proofs are a good way of avoiding
this problem, as they allow us to use onrete instanes of a theorem and its
proof, and yet prove a general theorem. A proedure to onstrut a shemati
proof in Diamond and CORE is to rst prove instanes of a theorem, e.g., a
diagram, then onstrut a shemati proof, and nally prove that this shemati
proof is orret. Using instanes of a theorem enables us to use onrete diagrams
in order to extrat formal general proofs.
Besides the ability to extrat general proofs from examples, it also appears
that reasoning with examples seems easier for humans to understand than rea-
soning with abstrat notions. The usual way in logi to prove Baker's theorem
by a mehanised provers is to use mathematial indution and a generalisation,
whih is diÆult to nd for both, a human and an artiial mathematiian {
a mehanised mathematial reasoning system. Furthermore, another way of di-
agrammatially proving Jamnik's theorem is to reason with abstrat diagrams
whih ontain problemati ellipses. Using shemati proofs and instanes of the-
orems seems an easier way to prove these theorems, and seems to onvey better
why the theorems hold.
5 Erroneous proofs
A generally aepted denition of a proof of a theorem in mathematial logi is
the one given by Hilbert. Here is a translation of a quote from Hilbert's artile [8℄.
\Let me still explain briey just how a mathematial proof is formal-
ized. As I said, ertain formulas, whih serve as building bloks for the
formal edie of mathematis, are alled axioms. A mathematial proof
is an array that must be given as suh to our pereptual intuition; it
onsists of inferenes aording to the shema
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S
S ! T
T
where eah of the premisses, that is, the formulas S and S ! T in the
array, either is an axiom or results from an axiom by substitution, or else
oinides with the end formula of a previous inferene or results from it
by substitution. A formula is said to be provable if it is the end formula
of a proof." [9, pages 381-382℄
What Hilbert is talking about is sometimes referred to as Hilbert's Pro-
gramme and is about the axiomatisation of mathematial systems. The deni-
tion of a proof in suh a system an be summarised as follows. A proof of a
theorem is a sequene of inferene steps whih are valid in some logial theory
that has a omplete axiomatisation, and whih redues a theorem that also be-
longs to this logial theory to a set of axioms, i.e., known true fats of the same
logial theory.
However, this denition is questionable as it implies that the only explana-
tion for errors in proofs is that they must be syntati ones. Namely, Hilbert's
argument suggests that all proofs boil down to a mehanial exerise of deom-
posing a theorem into a set of axioms of the theory to whih they all belong. We
suggest that syntati errors ould be automatially deteted during this deom-
position, and so erroneous proofs would not survive for years. In mathematis,
people do not always formalise all axioms and inferenes, yet their justiations
for the truthfulness of theorems are generally aepted as orret proofs of theo-
rems. For instane, onsider Eulid's proofs of theorems of geometry long before
a omplete axiomatisation of geometry was given by Hilbert [10℄.
Mathematial proofs of theorems sometimes turn out to be faulty. The history
of mathematis has taught us that there are plenty of faulty proofs of theorems
whih were for a long time onsidered to be orret, but later it turned out that
the \proofs" were not proofs at all, that is, they were inorret. Amongst famous
examples is Cauhy's proof of the onjeture whih says that the limit of any
onvergent series of ontinuous funtions is itself ontinuous. Cauhy's \proof"
persisted for almost forty years until the faulty onjeture was modied [5℄.
Another example is the 4-olour onjeture whih had faulty proofs [11℄. An
interesting disussion of this onjeture and its \proofs" is given in [12℄, and
a orret proof of this theorem an be found in [13℄. If Hilbert's denition of a
proof was an aurate desription of mathematial pratie, then these erroneous
\proofs" would not arise { any fault in the \proof" would be deteted quikly
as syntati error. So what is going on, why do erroneous \proofs" persist?
Clearly, in mathematis in general Hilbert's denition of a proof holds only
for a small part of mathematis, namely onjetures in logial theories whih
have omplete axiomatisations. However, not all mathematial onjetures are
part of known axiomatised logial theories.
Let us onsider the famous example of an erroneous proof of Euler's theorem,
given in x3.5. Analysing this proof, Lakatos [5℄ presents a number of ounter
examples in whih the method of proof, i.e., the shemati proof, fails. It turns
out that the initial theorem does not hold for all polyhedra. For example, it does
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not hold for hollow polyhedra, e.g., a solid ube with a ubial hole inside it,
sine V  E + F = 4. Note that the shemati proof fails at step 2.
The reader is referred to [5℄ for a number of ounter examples of this theorem.
One of the problems with Cauhy's shemati proof is that the denition of a
polyhedron is not learly stated. Therefore, a renement of a theorem is needed.
Lakatos's suggestion for this is to dene a polyhedron as a surfae and not as a
solid. Lakatos proeeds to disuss other ounter examples to Cauhy's shemati
proof, and nally renes the denition of a polyhedron in a way that Euler's the-
orem does hold. It turns out that the theorems holds for all simple
7
[5, page 34℄
polyhedra whose faes are simply onneted
8
[5, page 85℄.
Cauhy used a proedure for onstrution of shemati proofs in order to
onvine us of his \proof" of Euler's theorem. However, he did not arry out the
last step of the proedure for extration of shemati proofs, namely, he did not
verify that the shemati proof is indeed orret.
9
We argue that if he did use
the omplete proedure, then the fallay of the proedure would be deteted at
the veriation stage. Note that this would require a onstrutive denition of a
polyhedron.
It seems plausible that humans use some sort of shemati proedure to nd
general proofs of theorems. In partiular, humans often use examples of proofs
for ertain instanes and then abstrat them into a general shemati proof. If
not all the ases are overed by the examples, then the shemati proof might
be inorret, as in the ase of the proof of Euler's theorem mentioned above. If a
7
Simple polyhedra are ones whih an be strethed onto the plane, i.e., those that are
topologially equivalent to a sphere.
8
A surfae S is dened to be onneted if any pair of its points an be joined by a
ontinuous urve lying entirely within the surfae. Further, a surfae is said to be
simply onneted if any losed urve C on the surfae divides the surfae into two
distint regions, eah of whih is internally onneted in the sense just desribed,
and suh that any ontinuous urve whih joins a point in one of those regions to a
point in the other must ross the losed urve C.
9
A modern formal proof of Euler's theorem was devised only muh later and is aord-
ing to Lakatos [5, page 118℄ due to Poinare [14℄. It works by representing polyhedra
as sets of verties, edges and faes together with inidene matries to say whih
verties are in eah edge and whih edges are in eah fae. A restrited lass of
polyhedra is then turned into a formulae of vetor algebra and a alulation in this
algebra gives the value 2 for V  E + F . The proof is not intuitively lear, and it is
not easy to see why the theorem holds and why this formal proof is orret.
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ounter example is enountered, then the method needs to be revised to exlude
suh ases. It seems that humans sometimes omit this step all together. Human
mahinery for extrating a general shemati argument is usually onvining
enough to reassure them that the shemati argument is orret, e.g., onsider
the \proof" of Euler's theorem. Humans are happy with intuitive understandings
of denitions and steps in the proof { as long as they do not enounter a ounter
example, their general pattern of reasoning in the proof is aeptable. Lakatos
refers to suh mathematial proofs as \thought experiments". It is only reently,
in the 20th entury, that thought experiments were replaed by logial proofs.
In an automated reasoning system, formality is of ruial importane. The
orretness of the indued shemati argument has to be formally shown. This
onrms that a shemati proof is indeed a orret formal proof of a theorem. If
all proofs of theorems that people nd followed rules of some formal logi, then
there would be no explanation for how erroneous proofs ould arise. The errors
would always be deteted as syntatial errors, provided that the rules used to
prove the theorem are orret.
So, our seond onjeture is that human mathematiians often use a proe-
dure similar to the onstrution of shemati proofs in order to nd proofs of
theorems, but they often omit the veriation step whih ensures that the proof is
orret. We propose further, that omitting the veriation step of suh proedure
aounts for numerous examples of faulty \proofs". For instane, if one has not
onsidered all the representative examples, then the shemati proof may not
prove all ases of the theorem. A ounter example may be found.
6 Intuitiveness of shemati proofs
Here, we extend the point in x4 that reasoning with examples or instanes
of a problem is easier than reasoning with abstrat notions. We propose that
shemati proofs seem to orrespond better to human intuitive proofs. It appears
easier to see why the theorem holds by looking at the instanes of a theorem
and its proof and then onstruting a shemati proof, than onsidering a logi-
al proof. As evidene, we give four examples of theorems from x3, where their
shemati proofs are easier to understand than formal logial proofs: Baker's
proof of assoiativity of addition from x3.1, Jamnik's diagrammati proof of the
sum of odd naturals from x3.3, Penrose's sum of hexagonal numbers from x3.4,
and rotate-length theorem from x3.2.
We now onsider further the rotate-length theorem. The informal shemati
proof of this theorem is very easy to understand and to generalise to all ases of
any list.
In ontrast to a shemati proof of the rotate-length theorem, this theorem
is not easy to prove by a onventional (non-diagrammati) theorem prover. The
indutive proof of the rotate-length theorem usually requires generalisation: e.g.,
rotate(length(l); lk) = kl, where  is the list append funtion as dened
in x3.2. It is harder to see that this theorem is orret. Shemati proofs avoid
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suh generalisations. Baker used shemati proofs to exploit this fat for theo-
rems of arithmeti [1℄.
We propose that the shemati proof given in x3.2 is a ommon way that
people think about the proof of this theorem. Anedotal evidene from humans
suggests that shemati proofs are psyhologially plausible. This supports our
onjeture that shemati proofs orrespond better to human intuitive proofs.
7 A proposed study
In this paper we proposed a number of onjetures about shemati proofs.
1. Shemati proofs explain the use of examples for induing formal proofs.
2. Shemati proofs aount for erroneous proofs.
3. Shemati proofs are more intuitive than standard indutive proofs.
These onjetures are not yet supported by an empirial study, but by our
intuition and some suggestive examples. Hene, we propose an experimental
study whih ould support or refute our intuitions. The study would look at
some or all of the aspets of shemati proofs addressed in the previous setions.
In partiular, it would attempt to answer the following questions:
1. Do humans prefer to reason with onrete rather than general ases of a
problem? Do humans use a proedure similar to the onstrution of shemati
proofs when solving problems? If so, in what way do they use it and when?
2. Are there other examples whih support the onjeture that inomplete
shemati proofs aount for some erroneous proofs?
3. Is reasoning with examples easier than reasoning with abstrat notions? Are
shemati proofs more easily understood than formal indutive proofs? If so,
why do they appeal to humans more than formal indutive proofs?
The study proposed here would explore human intuitive reasoning in a novel
way. We think that humans nd shemati proofs easier to understand and more
ompelling than their logial ounterparts. This is also part of the reason why
humans might nd diagrammati proofs more intuitive than standard indutive
proofs. We have only anedotal evidene to support our belief. However, a om-
parative psyhologial validity experimental study ould be arried out to answer
some of the questions posed above and to provide some empirial evidene for
or against our laims.
The proposed study ould take the following form. An experiment ould be
arried out on a lass of students with a ertain level of mathematial knowledge
(probably nal year of seondary shool level { the students should be equipped
with the notion of mathematial indution). The lass should be suÆiently
large that the results are statistially signiant. The students would be given
examples of indutive theorems and non-theorems, and asked if they think the
theorem is true or not. If they think it is true, the students would be asked to
give an argument why they think it is true. Some of the non-theorems ould be
those whih hold for the majority of ases, but are not true for some speial and
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non-obvious ases. The students would also be asked to provide details of their
problem solving proess, i.e., the arguments that helped them reah a proof of
a theorem or a onlusion that the theorems does not hold.
The data olleted from the students would be analysed. Here are a few
aspets that ould be addressed in the analysis:
{ lassiation of problem solving strategies using some existing tehniques,
{ analysis of whether the arguments used in the proof are indutive, shemati
(using something like the onstrutive !-rule), or some other type,
{ analysis of the responses for non-theorems whih are true for most ases, but
not true for some more obsure speial ases:
 If the students realise that the onjeture is a non-theorem, how did they
disover this (espeially in the ase of a shemati argument)?
 If the students do not realise that the onjeture is a non-theorem, what
are the arguments that falsely reassure them that the onjeture is a
theorem and that it is true?
Another test that the students ould be given onsists of theorems and non-
theorems, and their proofs and faulty \proofs" respetively. Eah (non-) theorem
ould be aompanied with, say, three dierent (faulty) proofs eah following a
dierent strategy, e.g., indutive, shemati or other. In the ase of non-theorems,
the indutive argument would ontain some syntati errors and the shemati
argument would not be veried for orretness. The students would be asked to
hoose the proof that is most onvining and that they think they understand
best, and to elaborate on the reasons for their hoie.
The questions whih should be studied in more detail before the experiment
is onduted inlude how muh mathematial knowledge and knowledge of logi
should the students have. Should they be trained in mathematial indution,
onstrutive !-rule, and other problem solving tehniques? The danger is that
people who have some training in mathematis, but not in logi would solve
problems dierently from those trained in logi, or those with little knowledge
of mathematis and logi. Hene, the results would say less about the nature of
proofs than about the abilities of individual students. A possibility is to separate
subjets into two or more groups aording to their level of training, and study
the data aording to these groups.
Here, we gave some preliminary suggestions for the design of the proposed
experimental study. However, these ideas should be investigated in muh greater
detail before an experiment is onduted.
8 Conlusion
In this paper we posed several onjetures about the use of shemati proofs in
mathematis. These onjetures make laims about the psyhologial validity of
shemati proofs. First, we suggested that humans often use examples in order
to onlude a general mathematial statement. Seond, we onjetured that in-
omplete shemati proofs aount for some erroneous proofs. Our suggestion
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is that looking at faulty proofs that have survived for years might give us use-
ful insights into human reasoning. Finally, we onjetured that often shemati
proofs are more intuitive than their indutive ounterparts. These three on-
jetures are only supported by anedotal evidene, so there is a lear need for
a sienti experimental study whih would test them. The motivation for this
work is to investigate the nature of human mathematial thought and the notion
of mathematial proof. Shemati proofs provide a good ase study for suh an
investigation. Hene, our aim was to demonstrate that shemati proofs are wor-
thy of a further study by ognitive sientists, and to propose the sort of questions
that suh an experiment ould aim to answer. We hope that we provided enough
evidene and motivation that the study of psyhologial validity of shemati
proofs will be seen as a protable sienti investigation, and will ultimately
lead to further researh and useful results.
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